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Corporate governance is the current exhortation in India 
as well as the world over. As an offshoot of economic 
liberalization, global investment in the form of foreign 
direct investment and foreign institutional investment 
have gained momentum leading to vast economic growth 
in India.  On the other hand, major corporate scams that 
have occurred worldwide in recent times, have revealed 
that the need for strict supervision and scrutiny over 
corporate management and governance is a sin quo non 
for the protection of stakeholders and the growth of the 
nation which has to compete with the multinational 
companies in the global arena.   
Further, in India, most of the listed companies, and 
substantially all billion-dollar companies, are family-run.  
A particular characteristic of the Indian corporate 
landscape, however, is a tendency for individuals (and 
their families) to establish large interlocking networks of 
subsidiaries and sister companies that include partially 
owned, publicly listed companies. Such pyramidal 
structures can lead to severely inequitable treatment of 
shareholders. The extent of this control is frequently 
opaque to outsiders and undisclosed by insiders. A 
particular need for effective corporate governance in 
India is, therefore, to encourage the dynamism and 
growth of family. 
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The inclusion of Clause 49 by Securities Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI) in the listing agreement between 
companies endeavouring to have their securities listed in 
stock exchanges has impacted the modality of corporate 
management.  
This research paper examines the impact of clause 49 of 
listing agreement of SEBI on corporate governance. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance is the current exhortation in India as well as 
the world over. It has in its ambit the set of processes, customs, 
policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way in which a 
corporation is directed, administered, or controlled. Corporate 
governance has gained tremendous importance in the recent past 
especially after the second half of 1996. Two main reasons for this 
upsurge are:   
1. Economic liberalization and deregulation of industry & 
business, and 
2. Demand for new corporate governance in stricter 
compliance with the law of the land. 
Developments in India 
The initiative taken by government in 1991, aimed at economic 
liberalization and globalization of the domestic economy, led India 
to initiate reform process in order to suitably respond to the 
developments taking place worldwide.1 The report of the Cadbury 
Committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance in U.K 
has given a fillip to the debate on corporate governance in India.2
                                                          
1  RAJESH CHAKRABARTI, THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN INDIA – EMERGING 
ISSUES 210 (1st ed. 2006). 
 
2 K.M. GHOSH & DR. K.R. CHANDRATRE, COMPANY LAW WITH SECRETARIAL 
PRACTICE 3371 (Bharat Law House 13th ed. 2006). 
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Consequently, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 
Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) constituted 
committees to recommend certain initiatives which can be taken up 
in relation to corporate governance. CII took a special initiative on 
corporate governance. The objective was to develop and promote a 
code of corporate governance to be adopted and followed by the 
Indian Companies, be these in the private sector, public sector, 
banks, or financial institutes, all of which are corporate entities. The 
final draft of the said Code was widely circulated in 1997. The Code 
released in April 1998 and it was called “Desirable Corporate 
Governance Code.” 
Following CII’s initiative, the SEBI set up a committee under the 
Chairperson of Kumar Mangalam Birla to promote and raise the 
standards of corporate governance. The Committee in its report 
observed that “strong corporate governance is indispensable to 
resilient and vibrant capital markets and is an important 
instrument of investor’s protection. It’s the blood that fills the veins 
of transparent corporate disclosure and high quality accounting 
practices; it’s the muscle that moves a viable and accessible 
financial reporting structure.”3
In the year, 2002 SEBI analyzed the statistics of compliance with the 
Clause 49 by listed companies and felt that there was a need to look 
 
The recommendation of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee led 
to the inclusion of Clause 49 in the Listing Agreement in the year 
2000. These recommendations aimed at improving the standards of 
the corporate governance, and are divided into mandatory and 
non-mandatory recommendations. The said recommendations 
have been made applicable to all the listed companies with the 
“paid-up capital” of Rs. 3 crores and above or net worth of Rs. 25 
crores or more at any time in the history of the company. The 
ultimate responsibility for putting the recommendations into 
practice lies directly with the Board of Directors and the 
management of the company. 
                                                          
3 Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate 
Governance, web.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2012). 




beyond mere systems and procedures if corporate governance was 
to be made effective in protecting the interest of investors. SEBI 
therefore constituted a committee under the Chairmanship of Shri 
N.R. Murthy for reviewing implementation of the Corporate 
Governance Code by listed companies and issue revised Clause 49 
based on its recommendations.4
• As per Clause 49, for a company with an Executive 
Chairman, at least 50% of the Board of Directors should 
comprise independent directors. In the case of a company 
with a non-executive Chairman, at least one-third of the 
board should be independent directors. 
 
The matter of corporate governance has acquired much 
prominence consequent to the flow of foreign investment into the 
corporate sector of India. Foreign investors, whether in the form of 
FDI (foreign direct investment) or FII (foreign institutional 
investment), desire that corporate management and governance be 
mandatorily required by law to be done in an efficient and 
transparent manner. Accordingly, SEBI has revised Clause 49 of the 
Listing Agreement of the Indian Stock Exchange with effect from 31 
December 2005. It has been formulated for the improvement of 
corporate governance in all listed companies. 
• It would be necessary for chief executives and chief 
financial officers to establish and maintain internal controls 
and implement remediation and risk mitigation towards 
deficiencies in internal controls, among others. 
• Sub-clause VI (ii) of Clause 49 requires all companies to 
submit a quarterly compliance report to stock exchange in 
the prescribed form. The clause also requires that there be a 
separate section on corporate governance in the annual 
report with a detailed compliance report. 
• A company is also required to obtain a certificate either 
from auditors or practicing company secretaries regarding 
compliance of conditions as stipulated, and annex the same 
to the director's report. 
                                                          
4 THE INSTITUTE OF COMPANY SECRETARIES OF INDIA, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (MODULES OF BEST PRACTICES) 13 (5th ed. 2006). 
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• The clause mandates composition of an audit committee; 
one of the directors is required to be "financially literate.” 
• It is mandatory for all listed companies to comply with the 
clause by 31 December 2005. 
 Clause 49 of the SEBI Guidelines on corporate governance as 
amended on 29 October 2004 has made major changes in the 
definition of independent directors, strengthening the 
responsibilities of audit committees, improving quality of financial 
disclosures, including those relating to related party transactions 
and proceeds from public/ rights/ preferential issues. Certain non-
mandatory clauses like whistle blower policy and restriction of the 
term of independent directors have also been included. 
By Circular dated 8 April 2008, the SEBI amended Clause 49 of the 
Listing Agreement to extend the 50% independent directors rule to 
all boards of directors where the non-executive chairman is a 
promoter of the company or related to the promoters of the 
company. At the end of the first India Corporate Week in 
December 2009, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs issued new 
Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines and new Corporate 
Social Responsibility Voluntary Guidelines. Non-compliance with 
the provisions of corporate governance in clause 49 would invite 
penalties such as suspension of trading and delisting from the stock 
exchange. While SEBI can delist a company for non-compliance, 
even individual stock exchange has been empowered to suspend 
the trading of shares of defaulting companies. 
Lacunae in the Existing Clause 49 of Listing Agreement on 
Corporate Governance 
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement has changed largely the 
structure and working of the companies.5
                                                          
5 Vedant Shukla, Corporate Governance at Crossroads, THE PRACTICAL 
LAWYER, Sept. 7, 2007,  http://www.ebc- india.com/ practicallawyer/ 
index2.php?option=com_content&itemid=5&do_pdf=1&id=7007. 
 Introduction of corporate 
governance has infused enhanced transparency and ethics into the 
structure and working of companies. However, it is still a tough 
and long road ahead. Many loopholes and lacunae have to be taken 




care of in order to ensure better performance and implementation 
of corporate governance. For example, the present code allows the 
promoters to gain/retain control over the companies. The main 
implication of the share pattern is that leaving decision making to 
companies’ share-holders and their boards in effect, means giving 
full freedom to the promoters.6 In the present ownership pattern 
there is hardly any threat to incumbent managements of vast 
majority of companies. In most companies, institutional investors, 
who could have played the “monitoring role,” have either no 
presence or are only marginal players. The problem appears to be 
more severe in the case of smaller companies, which are generally 
avoided by institutional investors.7 There is also a possibility of the 
liberalized Companies Act, 1956 encouraging inter-corporate 
investments, which reduces the risk borne by the promoters while 
increasing their hold. It may seem that India has missed an 
opportunity to build an ownership structure, which while making 
the promoters genuinely interested, also would have kept them on 
a tight leash.8
Instances have been found where companies overlooked obvious 
linkages to confer independence on individuals probably taking 
advantage of this freedom. Promoters being firmly in saddle, the 
slim possibility of genuine independent directors getting elected to 
corporate boards have receded even further. It should be kept in 
mind that the companies are being rather forced to introduce such 
directors. As a result of this, companies have found out a way to 
avoid the probable problems faced by the induction of independent 
directors. In many companies, the promoters re-designated 
themselves as the non-executive chairman so that the company 









 But the major problem is that some companies are 
designating the promoters’ father-in-law, mother’s brother or 
wife’s brother as non-executive chairman as they are not regarded 
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as relatives under the Companies Act, 1956. SEBI had to make the 
Corporate Governance Code somewhat more palatable to them. It 
is, therefore, debatable as to what extent the efforts at improving 
corporate governance would succeed in the face of high promoter 
stakes. In fact, the prescribed minimum public shareholding is low 
that the management can get through even special resolution 
without any hindrance. It is easy to let promoters accumulate their 
holding but difficult to force them to bring it down. Effective steps 
should be taken at the entry point itself to curb the problem.10
Conclusion 
 
“Law without loyalty cannot strengthen the bonds of Empire.”11
“Corporate governance is beyond the realm of law. It stems from 
the culture and mindset of management, and cannot be regulated 
by legislation alone. Corporate governance deals with conducting 
the affairs of a company in such a way that there is fairness to all 
stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of 
stakeholders. It is about openness, integrity and accountability. 
What legislation can and should do is to lay down a common 
framework—the ‘form’ to ensure standards. The ‘substance’ will 
ultimately determine the credibility and integrity of the process. 
Substance is inexorably linked to the mindset and ethical standards 
of management.”
 In 
an energetic and lively environment, systems of corporate 
governance need to be continually evolved. The following lines 
from Narayan Murthy Committee Report aptly conveys this: 
12
Development and maintenance of a robust corporate governance 
framework therefore calls for the commitment of numerous 
persons and institutions throughout society. Legislatures, 
regulatory bodies, courts and self-regulating professional 
 
                                                          
10 Id.  
11 Thomas Mohr, Law without Loyalty- The abolition of the Irish appeal to the 
Privy Council 37, THE JURIST 187, 2002. 
12 Report of the Narayan Murthy Committee, http:// www.docstoc.com 
/docs/17063069/corporate-governance (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 




organizations must establish, monitor and enforce legal norms 
actively and even-handedly. Private associations and institutes 
must develop and promulgate codes of conduct, particularly with 
respect to corporate directors, that raise expectations for behavior 
and generate formal and informal sanctions for failure to meet 
these expectations. Educational institutions should promote 
research on professional and managerial ethics. Institutions 
throughout government and society must educate and train 
persons ranging from judges to regulators to managers and to retail 
investors. Investment advisors and business media must constantly 
weigh information provided by companies and probe for 
additional information of interest to investors. This would not only 
benefit the society but would also be beneficial for the companies 
as well. It is required that the government must step in and ensure 
the effective implementation of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement 
on corporate governance so that the interest of the investors must 
be protected as well as transparency in the corporate functioning 
may be maximised. But, it is imperative that governmental 
intervention must also be regulated i.e. it should be done sparingly 
and with utmost care and caution so as to ensure that corporate 
autonomy is not sabotaged.13 Though complying with the 
requirements of Clause 49 of Listing Agreement on corporate 
governance needs considerable effort on the part of the corporate 
managers, achieving this goal would bring governance of Indian 
companies at par with global corporate governance. Thus at the 
end it can be said that “a nation’s well being, as well as its ability to 
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural 
characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society.”14
                                                          
13  Shukla, supra note 5. 
14  Ruben Kraiem, Leaving Money on the Table: Contract Practice in a Low 
Trust Environment, 42 COLUMN. J. TRANSNAT’L.L. 715, 716 (2004). 
 
 
